How Do the Media Move Us?(第7回のリーディング)

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← 英語演習:第7回の資料

Reading for Session 7

How Do the Media Move Us?英語演習 第7回のリーディング(約2,380語)。

最終更新 2026年11月3日

第7回までに読んでおく英文です。訳しながら読むのではなく、まず全体を通して読み、どの考え方を誰が言ったのかをつかむ。わからなかった語を3つメモする。最後に「いちばん納得できた理論」と「いちばん疑問に思った理論」を、英語で1文ずつメモしておく。第7回で使います。

Read it through without translating, note who said what, note three words you did not know, and write one sentence each on the theory you find most and least convincing.

本文Text

Do the media change what we think and do? Many people answer, “Yes, but not me.” Companies spend huge amounts of money on advertising because they believe media messages work. At the same time, few of us believe that we bought something only because we saw an ad. Researchers have argued about this question for about a hundred years. This reading introduces seven well-known theories of media effects, that is, theories about how the media influence people. They are told here as a rough story in three parts. First came a fear that the media are very powerful. Then came research that said their effects are limited. Later, researchers returned to the idea that the media do have effects, but more subtle ones. The real history is messier than this, and most of these theories were built in the age of newspapers, radio, and television. As you read, ask whether each one still works in a world of smartphones and social media.

1. The magic bullet: an early fear

During the First World War, governments on both sides used posters, newspapers, and films to make people support the war. This is propaganda: messages made to change what large numbers of people think and do. In the 1920s and 1930s, radio came into ordinary homes, and in Germany the Nazi government used radio and film for propaganda. Many people worried that the mass media could control a whole population.

The idea behind this worry is now called the hypodermic needle theory, or the magic bullet theory. A hypodermic needle is the needle a doctor uses to give an injection. The picture is simple: the media “inject” a message into the audience, and everyone reacts in the same way, right away. The audience is passive, like a patient who cannot say no.

A famous example is the radio drama The War of the Worlds, broadcast in the United States in 1938. It told the story of an attack from Mars as if it were live news. The next day, newspapers reported that the program had caused panic across the country. However, a study by Hadley Cantril (1940) found that some listeners were really frightened and many were not, and that the difference depended partly on the listener, for example on whether they checked the story with another station or a newspaper. Later historians have argued that the newspapers made the panic sound much bigger than it was. So even this classic story does not show everyone reacting in the same way.

Textbooks and videos often say that the political scientist Harold Lasswell created the needle theory. Lasswell did write an important study of wartime propaganda, Propaganda Technique in the World War (Lasswell, 1927). But neither “hypodermic needle” nor “magic bullet” appears in that book. Some historians of the field, such as Sproule (1989), argue that no early researcher really stated the theory in this simple form. The “magic bullet theory” may be partly a story that later researchers told about the past, a simple picture that made their own findings look new.

Today, the theory sounds outdated. Nobody receives exactly the same message, and people comment on, criticize, and make fun of what they see. Yet when a dangerous “challenge” video spreads on TikTok, some news reports talk as if every teenager who sees it will copy it. People also say they were “brainwashed by the algorithm.” Is that the needle idea coming back, or just a way of speaking?

2. Voters who did not change: limited effects

In 1940, a team led by the sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia University studied voters in Erie County, Ohio, during the U.S. presidential election. They interviewed the same people several times between May and November. Many expected the radio and newspaper campaign to change a lot of minds. It did not. Most people decided early, and their vote could largely be predicted from their social background, such as religion, income, and where they lived. People also paid attention mostly to messages from the side they already supported. The campaign mainly reinforced, or made stronger, what people already believed. The study was published as The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944).

In The Effects of Mass Communication, Joseph Klapper (1960) brought together many studies like this one. His main conclusion was that mass communication usually reinforces people’s existing opinions rather than converting them to new ones. The media work together with other factors, such as family, friends, the groups people belong to, and what they already think. This view is called the limited effects (or minimal effects) theory. Klapper also worked for many years as a researcher for the CBS television network. Does that matter? That is a WHO? question.

Limited effects seems to fit social media in one way. Many people follow accounts that agree with them, and the feed then shows them more of the same. That looks like reinforcement, not conversion. But in other cases, social media seem to matter more than this theory expects. In the 2024 Tokyo governor election, for example, Ishimaru Shinji, a former city mayor without the support of a major party, came second, and many commentators connected his result to YouTube. Was that a media effect, or did the videos only reach people who were already looking for someone new?

3. Two-step flow: opinion leaders

The Erie County study found something else. When people explained why they voted as they did, they often talked about other people more than about radio or newspapers. In every social group, some people followed the campaign closely in the media and talked about politics with others. The researchers called them opinion leaders. Their idea was that information often flows in two steps: from the media to opinion leaders, and from opinion leaders to everyone else. This is the two-step flow theory.

Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld tested the idea in Personal Influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), a study of women in Decatur, Illinois. They looked at everyday decisions about shopping, fashion, films, and public affairs. They found that opinion leaders were ordinary people, not only famous or powerful ones, and that a person could be an opinion leader on one topic but not on another. You probably know someone like this: the friend you ask before buying a new smartphone, or the classmate who always knows which restaurant is good.

Today, YouTubers and influencers look like perfect opinion leaders, and companies pay them for exactly that reason. In this way the theory still seems to work. But there are problems. Many people now get news directly from an app’s recommendations, without any opinion leader in between, which looks more like one step. In other cases, a post is shared, quoted, screenshotted, and sent to a LINE group, which looks like many steps. Researchers call this multi-step flow. And when an influencer has millions of followers, is that person still a “person,” or have they become a medium?

4. What do people do with media? Uses and gratifications

The limited effects research made some researchers change the question. Instead of asking “What do the media do to people?”, they asked “What do people do with the media?” This approach is called uses and gratifications. A gratification is the satisfaction of a need or a want. Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973) summarized the approach: people are active, and they choose media to meet their own needs, such as getting information, relaxing, escaping from daily life, feeling connected to others, or thinking about who they are.

From this point of view, the same YouTube video can do different things for different people. One student watches it to practise English, and another plays it to fall asleep. You may open TikTok to pass time on the subway, but watch NHK news on a snowy morning to find out whether the trains are running.

At first, this theory seems to fit social media very well. We choose apps, follow and unfollow accounts, and block people. But recommendations, autoplay, and endless scrolling raise a question: are we choosing, or is the app choosing for us? Many people also cannot say clearly why they opened an app. Notice, too, that this theory is about audiences, not about the people who make media. The WHO? question (who owns, who profits, who decides) does not fit it well, and that is worth saying.

5. What to think about: agenda setting

From the late 1960s, researchers began to find media effects again, but different ones. They looked less at whether the media change opinions, and more at what people think is important, what they think the world is like, and whether they speak up.

In 1963, the political scientist Bernard Cohen wrote that the press may often fail to tell people what to think, but it is “stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13). The short version, “not what to think, but what to think about,” is often credited to McCombs and Shaw, but the idea in this form comes from Cohen. In 1968, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw tested it in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. During the presidential election, they asked 100 voters who had not yet decided which issues they thought were most important. Then they compared the answers with the issues covered in the newspapers, magazines, and TV news that the town used. The two lists matched very closely (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). They called this the agenda-setting function of the media. An agenda is a list of things to deal with. The media help decide which issues are on the public’s list.

In 2025, for example, the rising price of rice was a major story on Japanese TV news for months. The news did not tell viewers what to think about rice prices, but it made rice prices something that almost everyone thought about and talked about.

Who sets the agenda today? Some people say it is now the trending list on X or the recommendations on TikTok, and sometimes TV news reports what is trending online, which reverses the old direction. Also, everyone’s feed is different, so is there still one shared public agenda? On the other hand, when a big earthquake or a major election happens, almost every app and channel shows the same story.

6. The world on the screen: cultivation

George Gerbner, at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, began the Cultural Indicators project in 1968. His team counted acts of violence in American prime-time television and surveyed viewers. They compared heavy viewers, who watched many hours a day, with light viewers. Heavy viewers were more likely to give “television answers”: for example, they thought their chance of becoming a victim of crime was higher than it really was, and they were more likely to believe that most people cannot be trusted (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). Gerbner called this the mean world syndrome. He named the theory cultivation, because the effect does not come from one program. It grows slowly over years, the way a farmer cultivates a field.

Japan offers an interesting case. The number of crimes recorded by the police fell for about twenty years after its peak in 2002. Yet in a government survey carried out in 2021 and 2022, 54.5 percent of people said that public safety in Japan had become worse over the past ten years (National Police Agency, 2023). This does not prove that television caused the gap, but it is the kind of gap cultivation research looks at.

Critics point out that the link may run the other way: people who are already afraid may stay home and watch more television. Also, in Gerbner’s time, Americans watched a small number of networks, so heavy viewers saw similar stories. Today, two people who spend five hours a day on their phones may see completely different worlds. But an algorithm can also give one person a heavy dose of one kind of content, such as crime videos or perfect bodies. Does that make cultivation weaker today, or stronger?

7. Staying quiet: the spiral of silence

The German public opinion researcher Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann introduced the spiral of silence in a 1974 article and later in a book (Noelle-Neumann, 1974, 1984). Her starting point is that people are afraid of being isolated from others. So they keep checking which opinions seem to be winning. If they think their opinion is in the minority, they tend to stay quiet. People on the other side speak more freely, so their view looks even bigger than it is, and even more people stay quiet. That is the spiral. The media matter here because we often judge what “most people” think from what we see in the media.

Many students know this feeling from a LINE group chat: everyone seems to agree, so you do not post your different opinion. In Japanese, this is close to kuuki wo yomu, reading the air.

Does social media make the spiral weaker or stronger? A survey by the Pew Research Center in the United States, published in 2014, asked people about a major political news story of the time. It found that 86 percent were willing to discuss it in person, but only 42 percent of Facebook and Twitter users were willing to post about it on those sites (Hampton et al., 2014). On the other hand, people with minority views can easily find each other online, and a small but loud group can look like the majority. Online, it is often hard to know what the majority really thinks. If we cannot see the majority, how does the spiral work?

8. Thinking about the theories

The three-part story in this reading is a simplification. The theories did not simply replace each other, and researchers still use all of them. They also answer different questions. Some are about the senders and their power, and some are about audiences. The course’s three questions, WHO?, WHERE?, and WHAT’S MISSING?, fit the first kind better than the second. Saying clearly that a question or a theory does not fit a case is a useful result, not a failure. Later sessions look at the media from other angles: the propaganda model and encoding and decoding in Session 9, global media and political economy in Session 11, and Marshall McLuhan’s ideas about the medium itself in Session 13. In Session 7, you will be asked which theory still seems to work in the age of social media, which one fits least well, and why.

出典References

Cantril, H. (1940). The invasion from Mars: A study in the psychology of panic. Princeton University Press.

Cohen, B. C. (1963). The press and foreign policy. Princeton University Press.

Gerbner, G., & Gross, L. (1976). Living with television: The violence profile. Journal of Communication, 26(2), 172-199. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1976.tb01397.x

Hampton, K. N., Rainie, L., Lu, W., Dwyer, M., Shin, I., & Purcell, K. (2014). Social media and the “spiral of silence.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/08/26/social-media-and-the-spiral-of-silence/

Katz, E., Blumler, J. G., & Gurevitch, M. (1973). Uses and gratifications research. Public Opinion Quarterly, 37(4), 509-523. https://doi.org/10.1086/268109

Katz, E., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). Personal influence: The part played by people in the flow of mass communications. Free Press.

Klapper, J. T. (1960). The effects of mass communication. Free Press.

Lasswell, H. D. (1927). Propaganda technique in the World War. Knopf.

Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1944). The people’s choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign. Duell, Sloan and Pearce.

McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176-187. https://doi.org/10.1086/267990

National Police Agency. (2023). Reiwa 5-nenban keisatsu hakusho [White paper on police 2023]. https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r05/

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The spiral of silence: A theory of public opinion. Journal of Communication, 24(2), 43-51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1974.tb00367.x

Noelle-Neumann, E. (1984). The spiral of silence: Public opinion, our social skin. University of Chicago Press.

Sproule, J. M. (1989). Progressive propaganda critics and the magic bullet myth. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 6(3), 225-246. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038909366750

作成:志柿浩一郎。下書きには生成AI(Claude)を使いました。引用した文献は、すべて実在する資料です。

Written by SHIGAKI Koichiro with the help of generative AI (Claude). All cited works are real publications.

志柿浩一郎 北海道大学 大学院メディア・コミュニケーション研究院
SHIGAKI Koichiro, Research Faculty of Media and Communication, Hokkaido University
kshigaki@imc.hokudai.ac.jp

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